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RECENT POPULATION TRENDS IN .LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNAL INCOME INEQUALITY
1

In a recent paper , I explored the effects, on the conventional
measures of distribution of income among households, of demographic elements,
such as the size and changing composition of households through their life
cycle.

The exploration emphasized the need for taking explicit account of

these demographic elements in any attempt to observe trends in the long-term
levels of income differentials--particularly those associated with economic
growth, fl.nee the latter is usually accompanied by marked shifts in the size
and age-of-head distributions of households.

Of particular interest was the

negative association between per capita income and size of the household or
family, found also within the age-of-head classes and thus persisting through
the household's lifespan.

If this cross-section association is translated

into comparisons of per capita income for households of differing average
size over the lifespan, the result is a negative association between the
per capita income and size variables.

Since, in turn, siz~ of households

or families is largely a function of the number of children, the negative
association just noted is also one between lifetime per capita income and
fertility--provided that the differentials in fertility dominate differenti~ls
in mortality, as they did in the small sample of countries for recent years
used in the cross-section in the recent paper.
The present paper deals with a different, if related, question.
Given the major population trends observable in recent decades in the
economically less developed countries (LDCs), what can one infer as to the
possible effects on long-term levels or changes in them in the internal
distribution of income?

For obvious reasons of scarcity of relevant data,

and even more of the complex interactions between the population trends

I am indebted to Professor Yoram Ben-Porath of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

-2and the concurrent structural changes in the economy and society of the
countries involved, any answer to the question just raised is bound to be
speculative.

But there may be value in at least trying to formulate the

question unambiguously, and in attempting some explicit, relevant, specula
tion.
1.

The Major Population Trends
C

One must begin by stressing that the acceleration in the population
growth rate in the LDCs, and their markedly higher rate of natural increase
than in the economically developed countries (DCs), are recent.historical
trends--as is clearly indicat~d in Table 1.

Such recency, and the brevity

of the period over which these trends prevailed so far compared with the
preceding centuries of quite different domographic patterns, are basic to
the understanding, and evaluation, of both the trends and their implications.
Table 1 shows that form the mid-18th century and through 1920, the
rate of increase (overwhelmingly, of natural increase) in the LDCs was at
0

relatively low level, varying from less than a tenth to about five-tenths
of a percent per year (see colunn 5, lines 12-24).

2

Throughout this long

period of some 17 to 18 decades, the population growth rate in the DCs was
substantially higher--ranging from over four-tenths to well over 1 percent
per year; and showed a marked acceleration already in the first half of the
19th century.

It is only since the 1920s that the rates of natural increase

in the LDCs rose to approach those in the DCs; began to exceed the latter
in the 1930s and 1940s, when severe economic recession and then World War
II reduced population growth in the developed countries; andonly since
the 1950s did the annual growth rates of the LDCs climb to well over 2

<
·, .'
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-3Table 1:

Growth of Population, Economically Less Developed (LDC) and
Developed (DC) Countries, 1750-1975

A.

Absoulte Totals 2 in million

World
(1)

DCs.
(2)

LDCs
(3)

China
(4)

Other LDCs
(5)

1.

1750

791

201

590

200

390

2.

1800

978

248

730

323

407

3.

1850

1,262

347

915

430

485

4.

1900

1,650

573

1,077

436

641

5.

1920

1,860

673

1,187

476

711

6.

1930

2,069

758

1,311

502

809

7.

1940

2,295

821

1,474

533

941

8.

1950a

2,515

858

1,658

563

1,095

9.

1960a

2,998

976

2,022

654

1,.%8

8b.

1950b

2,501

857

1,644

558

1,086

9b.

1960b

2.986

976

2,010

654

1,346

10.

1970

3,610

1,084

2,526

772

1,754

11. 1975 (proj.
med. var.) 3,967

1,132

2,835

838

1,997

B.

Rates of Increase

(eer iear 2 Eer 1,000)

12.

1750-1800

4.3

4.2

4.3

9.6

0.9 .

13.

1800-1850

5.1

6.. 7

4.5+

5.2

3.5-

14.

1850-1900

5.4

10.6

3.3

0.3

5.6

15.

1900-1950

8.4

8.1

8.3

4.9

10.7

16.

1950-1975

18.6

11.2

22.0

16.4

24.7

17.

1900-1920

6.0

8.1

4.9

4.4

5.2

18.

1920-1930

10.8

12.0

10.0

5.3

13.0

19.

1930-1940

10.4

8.0

11. 8

6.0

15.2

20.

1940-1950

4.4

11.8

5.5-

15.3

21.

1950-1960

9.2
17.7

13.0

20.0

15.1

22.5-

22.

1950-1960

17.9

13.1

20.3

16.0

21.7

23.

1960-1970

19.2

10.6

23.1

16.7

26.8

24.

1970-1975

19.0

8.7

23. 3

16.5+

26.3

-4Notes to Table 1
DCs include Europe, USSR, North America, Temperate South America
(Argentina, Uruguay, Chile), Australia, and New Zealand.

LDCs include all

other.
Lines 1-4:

from United Nations, The Population Debate:

Dimensions and

Perspectives, Volume I, New York 1975, Table 1, pp. 3-4; and the original
paper by John Durand cited there.

The estimates for China here are from

the Durand paper.
Lines 5-9a

United Nations, World Population Prospects, New York 1966

Table A.3.1, p. 133.
Lines 9b-ll:

United Nations, Selected World Demographic Indicators,

1950-2000, mimeo. working paper ESA/P/WP.55, May 1975.
Lines 12-16:

Calculated from lines 1-4, 8b, and 11.

Lines 17-21:

Calculated from lines 5-9a

Lines 22-24:

Calculated from lines Bb-11.

-5percent, while those in the DCs declined by the early 1970s to less than 1
percent.

Thus, the acceleration and growth excess of population movements

in the LDCs were within a relatively short span of about five decades,
following centuries of growth at low rates that would look like stagnation
by modern standards.
The second important aspect of these recent trends is that the
acceleration, and the resulting excess in the rates of natural increase
in the LDCs over those in the DCs, was due wholly or almost wholly, to the
decline in the death rates--rather than to any movements in the birth rates.
A summary of the trends of these vital rates taken separately, hut un
fortunately limited to the years si.nce 1937, is presented in Table 2.

Part

of this table refers to observed changes, to 1970-75 3 ; the other part refers
to projections to the year 2000.

We deal with the observed changes first.

Between 1937 and 1970-75, a span of about 35 to 36 years, the rise
in the rate of natural increase for LDCs (excluding China) from 11.7 to
26.1, or some 14.4 points resulted from a combination of a decline in the
crude death rate from 30.8 to 16.0 or 14.8 points, and a drop in the birth
rate of only 0.4 points.

A similar dominance of the drop in the death rate

as the overwhelming factor in the rise in the rate of natural increase
over the period from 1937 to 1970-75 is true also of LDCs including China
(for both comparisons see lines 15-20, columns 2 and 5).

By contrast,

whatever movements occurred in the rate of natural increase in the DCs have
been due at least as much to declines in birth rates as they were to declines
in death rates (see lines 12-14, colunns 2 and 5).
It is interesting to estimate the trend were we to extend the view
to 1920, the date that is the dividing line prior to the acceleration in
the growth rate of LDC populations.

In line 17 of Table 1 we observe that

-6Growth Trends and Vital Rates (per 1,000), Observed 1971-1975,
and Projected 1975-2000

Table 2

A.

Absolute Totals and Growth Rates
1985
(4)

20000
(5)

3,967

4,816

6,253

915

1,132

1,231

1,361

1,423

1,808

2,835

3,585

4,893

899

1,203

1,997

2,612

3,745

1937
(1)

195.5
(2)

2,255

2,722

802

1975
(3)

Tota1 2 million
1.

World

2.

DCs

3.

LDCs

4.

LDCs, ex.
China

5.

Rates of Increase, eer Year, :eer 1 2000 Successive Intervals
17.6
18.6
19.0
11.3
World

6.

DCs

7.
8.

7.4

10. 7

8.4

6.7

LDCs

13.4

22.7

23.8

21.4

LDCs ex. China

16.3

25.7

27 .2

24.3

B.

Vital Rates 2 Levels and Changes

1937
(1)

Change to

1950-55
(2)

1950-55
(3)

1970-75

Change to

1970-75
(4)

(5)

1995-00
(6)

Change to

1995-2000 Total
Change
(8)
(7)

World
9.

CBR

35.8

-0.2

35.6

-4.1

31.5

-6.4

25.1

-10.7

10~

CDR

25.7

-6.9

18.8

-6.0

12.8

-3.9

8.9

11.

CRNI

10.1

+6. 7

16.8

+1.9

18.7

-2.5

16.2

-16.8
+ 6.1

DCs
12.

CBR

24.1

-1.2

22.9

-5.7

17.2

-1.6

15.6

- 8.5

13.

CDR

15.5

-5.4

10.1

-0.9

9.2

+o. 7

9.9

- 5.6

14.

CRNI

8.6

-+4. 2

12.8

+4.8

8.0

-2.3

5.7

- 2.9

LDCs
15.

CBR

42.5

-0.4

42.1

-4.6

37.5

-9.7

27.8

-14.7

16.

CDR

31.6

-8.3

23.3

-9.0

14.3

-5.7

8.6

-23.0

17.

CRNI

10.9

+7.9

18.8

+4.4

23.2

-4.0

19.2

+ 8.3

42.1

-11.3

30.8

-11.7

16.0

-7.1

8.9

-21.9

26.1

-4.2

21.9

+10.2

LDCs ex. China
18.

CBR

42.5

+2.0

44.5

19.

CDR

30. 8

-6.4

24.4

-2.4
...8.4

20.

CRNI

11. 7

+8.4

20.1

+6.0

-7Notes to Table 2
The estimates for 1937, lines 1-4, col. 1, are logarithmic

Panel A:

interpolations between the totals for 1930 and 1940 shown in lines 6-7 of
Table 1 above.

The other entries in lines 1-4 are from the source used

for Table 1 lines 8-b 11, with the use of the medium variant projection
throughout •
The rates of increase in lines 5-8 are from lines 1-4, with due
allowance for the varying durations of the intervals (which are 18, 20,
10, and 15 years respectively).
Panel B:
Col. 1:

Data from United Nations, World Population Trends, 1920-1947

New York, December 1949; Table 2, p. 10 shows the vital rates, and we took
the mid-value of the ranges shown.

DCs here comprise North America, Japan,

Europe, and Oceania {but exclude Temperate South America, a minor omission
here and a minor inclusion under the LDCs).
Far East" (after exclusion of Japan).

China is identified with "Remaining

The population weights used to combine

the rates are in the source, Table 1, p. 3.
Cols. 2-8:

Based on data from the UN working paper, used for lines 8b-ll

of Table 1 above (on Selected World Demographic Indicators by Countries,
1950-2000.)

-8-

the growth rate per year for LDCs for 1900-1920 was about 0.5 percent per
year, meaning a rate of natural increase of 5.0 per 1,000.

Assuming that

the crude birth rate in 1900-1920 averaged about the same as in 1937 (viz.,
42.5 per 1,000), we would obtain an implicit crude death rate for 1900-1920
of 37.5 per thousand--compared with a CDR in 1937 between 31 and 32 per
thousand.

If we assume that the recent downward trend in the crude death

rate for the LDCs did not begin until the 1920s, the conclusion is that
over a decade to a decade and a half prior to 1937, the drop in the CDR for
LDCs was about 6 to 7 points per 1,000--of the same order of magnitude that
was found in the somewhat longer periods from 1937 to 1950-5, and from 1950-5
to 1970-5 (see line 19, cols. 2 and 4).

And while the calculation is

obviously approximate, it is reasonable to conclude that the estimated
decline in the crude death rates was most likely much greater over that
period than any reasonably assumed change in birth rates.

4

Using the evidence in Table 2, and the approximate calculations in
the tex~one may summarize by saying that over the fifty years terminating
in 1970-75, i.e. between 1920-25 and the latter date, crude death rates in
the LDCs must have declined from over 37.5 to between 14 and 16 per 1,000
(see Table 2, lines 16 and 19, co. 5); whereas the crude birth rates may have
moved from 42.5 per 1,000 to either 42.1 (LDCs excluding China) or 37.5
(LDCs including China).

The drop over the five decades was thus about 22.5

points in the crude death rate, and between 0.4 and 5 points in the crude
birth rate--the rise in the rate of natural increase alm:>st completely
dominated by the down-trend in the death rate.
several aspects of this recent decline in death rates in the LDCs
should be noted.

These and other aspects of what appeared to have been

the major demographic revolution in world population have been widely

-95
discussed in the literatur e; but they deserve at least brief explicit

mention here.
The first aspect of the recent declines in death rates in the LDCs
is that they proceeded at a rate far exceeding that of the declines in
death rates in the currently developed countries in their past.

Table

3 illustrat es the contrast, in compariso n with the older European countries .
A drop of 22.5 points in the rates in the LDCs over five decades meant a
per decade decline of 4.5 points.

For the five Northern European countries ,

the rates of decline per decade were, for the successiv e intervals in
columns 5-7, 0.76, 0.84, and 1.80.

For the other four European countries ,

the per decade declines in the death rates were L 11 points for the interval
1850-1895 , and 2.10 for the interval from 1895-1925 .

If the initial position

of the LDCs in 1920-25 should be compared with that of the European countries
either in 1800 or in 1850, the rate of decline in the LDCs over the first
five decades of their demograph ic transitio n was from 4 to 5 times as high
as that for the older, settled, currently developed European countries .
One should also note that, in the earlier phases of the shift in
demograph ic patterns, the movements of the birth rates also in the currently
developed countries were at rates much lower than those in the death rates-
so that the initial rises in the crude rates of natural increase were, as
in the case of the recent trends for the LDCs, due predomina ntly to the declines
in mortality .
The second distinctiv e feature of the recent major drop in death
rates in the LDCs is that it occurred in regions in which the basic economic
and instituti onal structure s were little

affected by industria lization

and moderniza tion--whe reas the trends in death rates that we observed for
the currently developed countries in Table 3

occurred largely in as-

Table 3

Long Term Trends in Crude Vital Rates (per 1,000), Currently
Developed Countries (for Comparison with Recent Trends in the LDCs)

1800
(1)

Levels of Vital Rates
1925
1895
1850
(3)
(4)
(2)

1800-1850
(5)

Changes in Rates
1895-1925
1850-1895
(7)
(6)

Five Northern European Countries
1.

CBR

34.0

32.8

29.8

20.6

-1.2

-3.0

-9.2

2.

CDR

25.2

21.4

17.6

12.2

-3.8

-3.8

-5.4

3.

CRNI

8.8

11.4

12.2

8.4

+2.6

+o.8

-3.8

Four Other European Countries
4.

CBR

n.a.

31.5

30.0

21.2

n.a.

-1.5

-8.8

5.

CDR

n. a.

25.0

20.0

13.7

n.a.

-5.0

-6.3

6.

CRNI

n.a.

6.5

10.0

7.5

n.a.

+3.5

-2.5

Notes:
The averages in lines 1-6 are calculate d from the vital rates
summarize d in Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, Yale Universit y Press,
New Haven, 1966, Table 2.3, pp. 42-44.

Lines 1-3 include England and Wales,

Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; lines 4-6 include Belgium, France,
Germany, and Netherlan ds.

For all countries the year indicated represent s

the mid-point of a long interval over which the crude rates were averaged,
the interval varying between six, four, or one decade.

The en tries rep resent

unweighte d arithmeti c mears of the values for the individua l countries included.
The changes in columns 5-7 are derived directly from the
averages in columns 1-4.

''

-11sociation with marked upward movements in per capita product and, more
important, advances of the countries in the economic and institutional
transformation associated with modern economic growth.
true beginning with the mid-19th century.

This was certainly

And, one should add, both the

rapidity of the recent decline in death rates in the LDCs, and its occurrence
without association, in many of the regions involved, with any significant
economic and institutional changes, can be credited to the nature of the
technological revolution in dealing with infectious diseases and with the
major health problems of the LDCs, which apparently began after World War
I, and reached its most striking successes shortly after World War II.
Third, granted the importance of major innovations in the technology
related to control of diseases and of mortality, and the pervasive impact
of declines in 100rtality on LDC regions and countries differing widely in
institutional and economic structure, complementary effects of other
technologies were required and differences in exposure to modernizing
influences continued to affect death rates.

After all, the new medical

and public health tools had to be made accessible to all population groups
in the LDCs to produce the wide effects observed (see comment below);
here, the technological revolution in transport and communication played
an important role.

And differences in extent and duration of exposure to

modernizing influences are reflected even now in death rate differentials
among major groups of LDCs (and would be even more prominent in single
country comparisons).

Thus, Table 4 below shows that even by 1970-75 crude

death rates in Subsaharan Africa (excluding the Southern region) were, at
22 per thousand, over twice as high as those for Latin America (excluding
the Temperate Zone) at somewhat over 9 per thousand.

-12Finally, one should note that declines in death rates (as in other
vital rates) of the magnitude suggested for the LDCs over the last fifty years-
and perhaps even for each

ot

the quarter century subperiods separately--mean

that the demographic trends involved must have necessarily affected large
proportions of the total population involved.

For each of these vital

rates is a weighted average of group specific rates, weighted by the groups'
proportions in the total.

Thus, a decline in the crude death rate of a

few points, say from 32 to 30 per 1,000, could well be accounted for by a
decline of 6 points occurring for a group whose 100rtality declined from
32 to 26 per 1,000 while that of the remaining group stayed constant--the
two groups accounting for one-third and two-thirds of the total population
respectively.

But a much larger decline, and conditions in which the death

rate of a small group in the total population cannot be sharply reduced
while mortality remains high in the rest of the population, mean that the
impact of the decline must necessarily have been widespread.

This point

is of analytical importance, considering the contrast between the sharp
downtrends in the death rates and the minor declines in birth rates--with
implications for the possible differential impacts of the two sets of
trends on the various groups in the population, particularly the smaller
economic and social groups at the top and the much larger proportions of
the population at middle and below average economic and social levels.
In turning now to the sections of Table 2 that relate to
population and vital rate projections to year 2000, we may view the latter
as informed judgments of the likely domographic trends--on the assumption
that no great catastrophies or miraculous boons introduce major discontinuities,
and the more interesting assumption that economic and social progress will
be at a feasible pace to warrant expectation that the growing populations

-13will be sustained at acceptable levels.

6

From our standpoint, the major

interest in tnese projections is their indication that while the
growth rates and the vital rates in the developed countries will move
slowly downwards over the last quarter of this century--an d show no declines
in the death rates, for LDCs (excluding China) death rates will still decline
And while the birth rates for the

substantial ly (see line 19, col. 6).

LDCs are assumed to drop even more (see line 18, col. 6), the projections
for the last quinquenniu m still show a rate of natural increase over 2
percent per year, and well above the initial rates either in 1937 or even
in 1950-55.
But given the large magnitudes of, and some significant disparities
within, the total of LDCs, it is useful to consider the magnitudes and
projections separa~ely for the major LDC regions--an d with some time break
from 1970-5 to 1995-2000 (Table 4).

The total LDC population for 1975

accounted for in this table can be compared with that in Table 2 above,
for LDCs excluding China--and it is 1,918 million compared with 1,997 in line
4, col. 3 of Table 2.
One should begin by noting the dominance of the South Asia region
in the 1975 total, and the Asian contributio n would become all the larger
were we to include China.
Table 2 is 838 million.

In 1975, the population for China implicit in
Of the total

for South Asia, the contributio n of

what might be called the clearly Hindic group (Bangladesh , Pakistan, and
India) was 758 million.

Thus, of the total in 1975 of the four regions

shown in Table 3 plus China, viz. 2,756 million, as much as 1,596 million
was accounted for by the two areas that could be designated as centers of
the centuries-o ld Sinic and Hindic civilizatio ns.

Of the total additions

over the twenty five year interval from 1975 onwards, some 1,984 million,

-14310 million are projected for China (see Table 2) and another 593 million
for the three Indian countries listed above.

Thus by the year 2000, the

areas that are the centers of these two old civilizations would still acconnt
for 1,148 plus 1,351 billion, or~ total of some 2.5 billion out of an
aggregate for all LDCs in the four regions of 4.74 billion.

The emphasis

on this large contribution 6f these two old civilizations to the population
bulk, and current and projected excess growth of the LDCs, points to a
consideration of the past economic and social innovations that permitted
the sustained growth of this population mass on an area far smaller than
that occupied by the other LDCs--innovatio ns in agriculture, and institu
tional devices, that would presumably affect the responses of the relevant
populations to the declines in the death rates, and to the changing role of
economic opportunities

the next generation in the adjustment to widening
associated with industrializati on and modernization.

7

There were marked differences among these groups in the levels of
death rates in 1950-55, the earliest quinquennium for which the comparison
is easily feasible.

In Latin America, these death rate, were as low as

15.2, as result of preceding declines that proceeded at a slow pace to the
1930s, and accelerated thereafter.

8

In the same quinquennium, the crude

death rates ranged from 22 1/2 to 28 1/2 per thousand in the three other
LDC regions.

With the crude birth rates at roughly similar levels, the

result was a substantial range in rates of natural increase, from 19 to 28
1/2 per thousand.
Over the twenty five year period to 1975, there wa~e substantial
declines in the crude death rates in all four LDC regions, leaving the
differentials in death rates in 1975 even wider, at least proportionally ,
than they were in 1950-55 (see column 3, which shows a range from 9.3 for

-15Table 4

Vital Rates (per 1,000), Observed (to 1970-75) and Projected
(to 1995-2000, Medium Var.), LDC Regions

1950-55 Change to 1970-75 Change to 1980-85 Change to 1995-2000 Total
1aac:;-nn
lQRO-c:;
1Q70-'l
Change
(1)
(3)
(2)
(7)
(4)
(5)
(8)
(6)
East and Middle South Asia (1,162; 2,093)
1.

Crude B.R. 44.1

-2.2

41.9

-3.5

38.4

-10.2

28.2

-15.9

2.

II

D.R. 25.2

-8.7

16.5

-3.8

12.7

-3.9

8.8

-16.4

3.

II

RNI

+6.5

25.4

+o.3

25.7

-6.3

19.4

+ 0.5

-4.0

43.1

-2.4

40.7

-9.1

30.6

-15.5

18.9

Middle East (196;

4.

Crude B. R. 47.1

366)

5.

II

D.R. 22.4

-7.6

14.8

-3.1

11.7

-3.8

7.9

-14.5

6.

"

RNI

+3.6

28.3

+o. 7

29.0

5.3

23.7

- 1.0

-1.1

47.6

-1.0

46.6

-4. 7

41.9

- 6.8

24,7

Subsaharan Africa ~275; 566)
7.

Crude B. R. 48.7

8.

"

D.R. 28,6

-6.8

21.8

-3.6

18.2

-5.4

12.8

-15.8

9,

II

RNI

+5.7

25.8

+2.6

28.4

+o. 7

29.1

+ 9 .o

20.1

Latin America (ex. Temperate Zone, 285;567)
10.

Crude B.R. 43.7

-4.8

38.9

-2.3

36.6

-6.0

30.6

13.1

11.

II

D.R. 15.2

-6.0

9.2

-2.0

7.2

-1.9

5.3

-9.9

12.

II

RNI

+1.2

29.7

-0.3

29.4

-4.1

25.3

-3.2

28.5

LDCs (The Four Regions Above, 1,918;3,592)
13.

Crude B. R. 45.0

-2.6

42.4 ·

-2.8

39.6

-8.7

30.9

-14.1

14.

II

D.R. 23. 9

-7.9

16.0

-3.4

12.6

-3.8

8.8

-15.1

15.

"

RNI

+5.3

26.4

+o.6

27 .o

-4.9

22.1

+ 1.0

21.1

-16Notes to Table 4
The underlying data are all from the UN 1975 Working Paper cited in
the notes to Tables 1 and 2 above.
The totals entered in parentheses following the designation of regions
are the 1975 and year 2000 populations of the region, in million.
East and Middle South Asia is a combination of East South Asia and
Middle South Asia.

The internal weights, based on the 1975 population, are

3 and 7, for the two

subregions respectively.

Middle East comprises Western South Asia and North Africa, with
approximately equal weights.
Subsaharan Africa includes three subregions--Eastern Africa, Middle
Africa, and Western Africa (with approximate weights of 4, 2, and 4).

Southern

Africa was omitted because of the weight in it of the Union of South Africa,
and the mixed composition of its population with different levels of economic·
development.
Latin America comprises the Caribbean, Middle America, and Tropical
South America, with approximate weights of 1, 3, and 6.

The Temperate

zone (Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile) was omitted.
The total of LDCs is a weighted average of the four regions (with
weights of 60, 10, 15, and 15, for the regions in the order listed).
For more detail concerning inclusion of individual countries
see the source.

China and East Asia, in general, are omitted; and so are

some LDCs in Oceania.

-17Latin America to 21.8 for Subsaharan Africa) and the declines in the death
rates were ?ubstantially larger than the declines in birth rates, leading
to a rise in the rate of natural increase, in all four regions.

Yet for

Latin America, the region furthest along in the demographic transition,
the decline in birth rates was more substantial; and the rise in rates of
natural increase rather minor.

The result was that by 1975, the regional

differentials in rates of natural increase were narrow (from 25 1/2 to 29
1/2)--the rates being at relatively high levels in all four regions.
But the most interesting part of Table 4 is the indication that
for three of the four regions, exluding Latin America, the next decade, to
the mid~l980s, will show again agreater declines in the death rates than in
the birth rates--with consequent further rises, even though minor, in the
rates of natural increase.

It is only in the period after the mid-1980s,

that the birth rates are expected to decline substantially enough to exceed
the still expected further declines in the death rates.

Even so, one

region--Subsaharan Africa-- i~ according to the present projections, to
show rising rates of natural increase practically to the end of the century.
Further subdivisions within the regions would reveal even further
differences among various groups of the LDCs in the levels of their vital
rates; while further distinction of narrower time periods would reveal more
clearly differences in past and projected changes in these basic demographic
trends.

Thus, the differences ruoong the presently distinguished four regions

with respect to the timing in the demographic transition--from Latin America
as the most advanced to Subsaharan Africa as the least--would be refined
further; and so would the difference in timing in reaching the peak rate of
natural increase, and the peaks and troughs in the underlying birth and
<leath rates.

But the distinctions in Table 4 are sufficient to indicate

-18-

both the similarities and the major differences in the movements of the
death rates, in their relation to the levels and changes in the birth
rates; and to remind us of the diversity of the demographic, and implicitly
economic and institutional patterns, among the major groups within the LDC
universe.

The recognition of this diversity is particularly important, as

we shift now to an exploration of the possible implications of these move
ments in death rates, in their relation to those in birth rates, for the
internal economic distributions in the countries affected.
2.

Some Implications
What were the likely effects of the recent population trends in

the LDCs, summarized in the preceding section?

In attempting to formulate

some speculative but plausible answers to this question, it seemed best to
start with (a) the effects of the rapid and striking declines in the death
rates; and then turn to (b) the possible reasons for the lag in the declines
of the birth rates.

The separation between the two trends may seem artificial;

and yet it will be argued below that the choices with respect to the down
ward movement of death rates were more limited than those with respect to
the adaptive movement of birth rates.

If only for this reason, one is

warranted in considering the two sets of trends separately, before attempting
to combine their possible effects.
(a)

Declines in Death Rates
In dealing with the effects of the recent major declines in trortality

in the LDCs, we may ask first what kind of demographic patterns prevailed
in these countries before, when high death and birth rates yielded low
rates of natural increase.

Were there substantial within-country differences

among the various economic and social groups, in demographic structure and

-19in the rates of natural increase?
No adequate direct evidence to answer this question is available to
me, al though a long

search in the literature and greater familiarity with

the sources might have provided it.
suggested.

But some plausible conjectures can be

First, in these pre-1920 decades, as Table 1 indicated, the

DCs were characterized by markedly lower death rates than the LDCs, so that
the rate of natural increase in the former was substantially higher--despite
the fact that their birth rates were substantially lower.

This suggests that,

.with death rates in the LDCs at these high levels, even a moderate proportional
lowering of the death rate could allow for a moderate decrease in the birth
rate and still result in a substantial rise in the rate of natural increase.
With CDR at say 40 and a CBR at 45, a drop in the former to 36 and in the
latter to 42, would mean a rise in the rate of natural increase to 6 per
1,000--by a full fifth.

One may reasonably assume that also within the LDC

country or region, there could have been differences among economic and social
groups, where greater wealth and easier access to means of subsistence could
have resulted in appreciably lower death rates--and even if these led to
somewhat lower fertility, the

wre favored economic of social groups

might have attained a higher rate of natural increase--just as the DCs did
in the comparison with the LDCs.

This would particularly likely to be the

case, so long as higher economic and social status were not connected with
greater health risks in urban conditions (if urban living was a pre
requisite of higher income).

But in the countries and times of which we

are speaking, urban populations constituted a minor fraction of total
population. 9
The implication is that in the earlier, pre-1920 decades of high
levels of both mortality and fertility, differences within the LDCs is

-20economic and social status may have been associated with reductions in mortality
that were substantial , and larger than the likely restraints on fertility (if
any)--thus yielding a higher rate of natural increase among the upper social
and economic groups than among the lower.

If this implication is valid, the

resulting contrast with the conditions in times and conntries in which the
over-all level of death rates has been reduced sufficientl y so that large
relative mortality differeµtia ls could not convert even minor birth-rate
excesses into equally or shortage of the rates of natural increase, is of
major analytical importance.
Unfortunate ly, I can find only illustrativ e evidence, relating primarily
to differentia ls in death rates in one or two less developed countries by
economic or social status (directly given, or associated with some ethnic
group distinction s); as well as separate evidence on birth rates by social
status or ethnic grouping--b ut not the two bodies of evidence together.

Thus

to cite an example for India--the expectation of life for Parsis was (combined
with equal weight for men and women) at birth, in 1931, as high as 53 years-
compared with 32 years for total population; and the difference
is "attributed in large measure measure to the relatively advantageou s
position of the Parsis." 10 If we apply crude conversion ratios to expectation of life at birth to derive crude death rates as used by Kingsley Davis,
i.e. setting the latter to 1,000 divided by expectation of life) 11 the corresponding CDRs are 19 per 1,000 for the Parsis (a small group in the large
total) compared with over 31 per 1,000 for total population- -a difference
that may or may not have been compensated fully by the difference in crude
birth rates.

Similar evidence of substantial differences in death rates

appear in the summary of a sample survey of rural families in Punjab in

-211931.12

One may note that in the 1973 edition of United Nations, The Determina nts ••

the relevant section on mortality different ials in less developed countries
(par. 132, p. 139) begins with a statement that informati on on these "dif
ferential s by occupatio n, income, and education is ••• sparse" and quotes but
a few illustrati ons, mostly for the late 1950s or early 1960s.
A

related illustrati on of interest can be derived from the vital

rates for the United States, when the distinctio n is made between the white
populatio n and the non-white (the latter predomina ntly Negro).

For 1905-1910

(the earliest period for which the compariso n is given) the gross reproduct ion
rate was shown at 1,740 for the white populatio n and 2,240 for the nonwhite- 

an excess of the latter of some 30 percent; but the net reproduct ion rate,
i.e. the one that takes account of mortality , was 1,339 for the white
populatio n and 1,329, somewhat lower, for the nonwhite populatio n.

This is

an illustrati on of greater mortality in the economic ally and socially dis
advantage d group more than offsettin g a much higher fertility ; and it is
shown for a period when crude death rates averaged (for 1900-04) 16 per
thousand for the white populatio n and about 26 per thousand for the nonwhite. 13
It is plausible to assume that further back in time, when the level of death
rates was appreciab ly higher, their excess may have produced an even greater
differen tial in rate of natural increase in favor of the white populatio n.

BY

contrast, in the latter period, when death rates declined, for both

white and nonwhite populatio n, the net reproduct ion rate of the nonwhite
populatio n began to exceed that of the white by a large margin.

Thus, by

1957 (the peak year in the US reproduct ion' rates in recent times) the gross
rate of the nonwhite populatio n, at 2,371, exceeded that of the white at
1,764, by almost 40 percent; the net rates were 2,206 and 1,701 respectiv ely,
an excess of almost

30

percent.
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-Finally, one should note briefly the data on demography of peasant
comnrunities.
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They deal

largely with fertility, strongly suggesting,

but with some exceptions, that fertility is higher among the richer (in
terms of land) peasants than among the poorer; with mortality, at least
in the children's ages, also being distinctly lower among the rich.

The

result then is a positive association within the peasantry between higher
economic position and the rate of natural increase.

But the results are

qualified by sparsity of coverage, particularly for LDCs in the premodern periods of high mortality; the limitation of the data largely to
fertility; the absence of data on per capita income of the peasant families
classified by size over the life cycle; and the difficulty of assigning
weights to the peasant population (distinctly smaller than the rural)
within the total.

A further exploration of the field, not feasible here,

may yield significant findings.
If it be assumed that the rate of natural increase within the LDCs,
prior to the recent sharp decline in death rates, was greater among the
upper economic and social groups, the situation would have been in sharp
contrast to that in the DCs for a number of decades and that in the LDCs
once over-all death rate levels have been reduced substantially.

The more

familiar finding is that the birth rates and the rates of natural increase
have been greater among the lower income groups--associated with the greater
lag in the declines of birth rates among the former, in conditions in
which a generally lower level of death rates reduced the weight of the
death variable in offsetting births.

This also meant that in the earlier

times in the LDCs, the number of survivinz children per family--once it
reached a decade or oore beyond the marriage date--was greater among the
upper economic and social grot.1ps than among the lower, with the n.~cessary

.,··

-23qualification concerning the urban death rate excess over the rural.

Since

the number of surviving children in turn is a major factor in determining
the size of the family (the other being the degree of "jointness"), it is
possible that the average size of the family was larger a100ng the upper
than among the lower economic and social groups; and that the average income
of this larger family, even on a per capita basis, was significantly greater
than that of the smaller-size family a100ng the lower economic and social
Such positive association between the size of family and per capita

groups.

income is not found in recent cross-section studies, which are naturally
limited either to DCs or to LDCs with death rates already substantially
reduced by recent advances in health technology.

On the contrary, the

negative association between size of family or household and its per capita
income is a common finding; and while qualified by changes in income levels
over the life cycle, still remained a major result in the analysis in the
recent paper cited in footnote 1 (see Section III, pp. 23-48, on size of
family or household effects).
But more important here is the implication that this situation
of higher death rates and lower rates of natural increase among the lower
economic and social groups meant a serious aggravation of already existing
inequalities, in that shorter life spans, greater morbidity, and fewer
children surviving to productive ages, were both cause and effect of
lower economic returns over the family's productive lifespan.

This as

sociation of lower economic position with higher rates of death and morbid
ity persisted, of course, beyond the transition in the population patterns
from pre-modern to modern times; and are still found in the DCs in recent
decades.

But the effects of this association must have been far greater

when death and morbidity rates were so high; and when substantial reductions

'

-24in them could be attained by more food, better clothing and shelter, and
greater mobility for protection against epidemics or famines.

Of course,

we cannot guage now these death-rate and rate-of-natural-increase dif
ferentials; nor test their persistence in conditions of frequent short
term rises in death rates that might have swept over rich and poor alike.
But one may assume that if there were these death and natural increase
differentials in the pre-modern LDCs, they only served to aggravate long
term economic inequalities rather than to temper them.
In this connection, the exploratory illustraticnsof economic losses
represented by the deaths of children and young adults in the Appendix to
. this paper is of interest.

These exploration,compare the losses of past

inputs into children and young adults (the latter dying before their net
contribution might have fully covered the inputs into their consumption
in the past), in a less developed and developed country in the 1930s-
relating these annual losses to the total annual product of each of the
two cotmtries.

The results of the comparison, in their indication of

relative losses involved in such deaths being over five times as great in
the less developed than in the developed country, are only suggestive of
what might be found in a comparison of similar losses from deaths for the
richer (lower mortality) and poorer (higher mortality) groups within a
pre-modern LDC.

Clearly, the burden of such losses was proportionally

much greater among the lower income groups, representing a greater
relative drain on their long-term economic capacity and resources.
The purpose of the comments above is to provide a tentative base
for evaluating the effects of the striking declines in death rates that
we find in the tables in the first section.

Given their magnitude and

;he character of the major causal factors that were involved.

it is

-25reasonable to infer that these reductions in death rates were widespread;
that their absolute magnitude was greater a100ng those groups in the popula
tion for whom the initial levels were higher; and that consequently their
effects on the rates of natural increase were far greater for those groups
in the population for whom these rates were initially lower, viz. the
larger groups at the lower economic and social levels.

If the death rates

for the upper and lower groups could differ by as much as 10 points (e.g.
30 to 40), it could be expected that a major step forward in health care
and medical technology applicable without a major input of scarce resources
and without requiring major changes in patterns of life, would affect the
higher death rates absolutely more than it would the lower death rates
levels already reduced by more favorable economic conditions in the past.
And one could also argue that the benefit to those who have sustained the
losses in the past caused by higher death rates would also be greater.

The

immediate implication, subject to a major qualification to be noted below,
is that the differential reduction in death rates plausibly assumed above,
the resulting convergence of internal death rates among various economic
and social groups, meant the reduction of an important aspect of persisting
inequality that loomed large in the pre-modern LDC societies.
Before we consider the possible qualification on the equalizing
effects of the internal differentials in reduction of death rates in the
LDCs, once the major declines began, one should stress two aspects of the
trends under discussion.

The first, already noted, is that there was

little choice possible, or wanted, in incurring these declines.

If they

came, largely as effects of developments in the DCs brought into the LDCs
as it were from the outside, relieving sickness and death without incurring
perceptible economic and social costs, there was no incentive for resisting

-26the much desired opportunity for longer and healthier life.

In that

sense, the situation was quite different from the choices relating to
birth rates, the reduction of which involved a variety of alternative s within limits that could spell substantial differences in population growth
rates, for countries or for groups within them.

Second, and more important,

once contacts with the developed parts of the world were increasingl y numerous,
it became obvious that the reduction in death rates (and associated reduction
in rates of morbidity) was a necessary if not sufficient requirement for a
healthier, long-lived, populations --with the,possib ility of longer investment
in the training and education of the younger generation preserved from
demographic calamities, with the chances of developing a forward spirit in
a population justifiably believing in control by man over his

destiny, and

a family structure in which smaller size and fewer children would make
possible a better adjustment to widening economic and social opportuniti es.
Rejecting the contacts that reduced the death rates would thus mean rejecting
also the possibility of shifting to a modern demographic pattern and moderniza
tion of society that could also mean better use of the potentials of economic
growth.

14
The conclusion is that the reduction of the death rates from their

initial high levels in the LDCs in the 1920s was an indispensab le condition
for eventual modernizati on and participatio n in modern economic growth-
while the rapidity and magnitudes of the declines were a unavoidable (were
anybody willing to avoid it) effects of the new technology in situations of
an accumulated backlog of high mortality and high morbidity problems.
Whatever the immediate, or shorter term other consequence s of these trends,
particularl y those when the failure of birth rates to decline resulted in a
rapid acceleratio n of the rates of natural increase, in the longer run the

,! '

-27major declines in death rates were necessary as a pre-condition of the
declines in birth rates and of other adjustments to the modern demographic
patterns of population growth.
The major qualification alluded to above is, of course, the consequence
of lag of the decline in birth rates--in conditions where the basic innovation
introduced by the reduction in death rates occurred without being accompanied
bY sufficient changes in other aspects of social and material technology.
In such conditions, and provided there was,- as there was likely to be with
stagnant social structure and production technology, scarcity of the traditional
·resour~es (whether they be land or reproducible capital), a rapid acceleration
of rates of natural increase among the groups hitherto below the upper
economic and social levels may have meant suddenly increased pressures of
augmented labor supplies on scarce complementary resources.

Whether under

these conditions a longer and healthier working life of the members of
a family compensated, over the lifecycle, for the greater pressure of labor
on resources, is a question that does not admit of an easy answer; and the
answer would vary among various groups of LDCs, depending upon the initial
resource endowments and the degree to which further advances in traditional
technology were possible with augmented labor.

Here the added knowledge

concerning the demographic and economic structures of LDCs prior to the
recent declines in death rates would be required to provide even tentative
answers.

But one cannot exclude the possibility that in some cases the

longer productive lifespan and greater increase of the lower economic and
social groups may still have resulted in some widening of internal income
inequality, because of the advantage taken by upper groups of the
greater pressure of labor on land or on other capital; while in other cases
the inequality-reducing internal convergence of rates of mortality and

-28morbidity among the several economic groups might have resulted in reduction
of internal income inequality --even if the crude brith rates continued at
high levels and failed to respond for some time to the declines in death rates.
On

this uncertain conclusio n, we end our discussio n of the effects

of declines in mortality in the LDCs.

One should emphasize to the end,

both the indispens able, and in the longer run beneficia l, effects of the
declines in the death rates--reg ardless of whether their immediate and
direct effect was to widen or to narrow internal income inequalit ies.

This

emphasis might have been superfluo us, except for the tendency in much recent
discussio n of the problems created by rapid populatio n growth to neglect the
source of the latter in the declines in mortality and morbidity --and thus
to understat e, by omission their vitally important and beneficia l long-term
effects. 16
(b)

Lags in the Decline of Birth Rates
The long lag in fertility decline behind the downtrend in mortality

is illustrat ed in Professor Lindert's paper for this Conferenc e, on "Child
Costs and Economic Developm ent"; and is strongly suggested for the LDCs in
the initial section of this paper, with its emphasis on the dominance of
declines in mortality in contribut ion to a rising rate of natural increase
in the face of constant or only slightly dropping birth rates.

The present

section deals with a few aspects of the response of birth rates to the major
declines in death rates in the LDCs.
Even though the would-be parental pair is the immediate decision
unit in this response, one must allow for the wider, blood-rel ated groups
(an extended family, a tribe, an ethnic group, a caste) that may set the
norms for the would-be parents.

In addition, there are the large non-blood

-29collectives, particularly the government, which may react to declining death
rates and accelerating population growth in a variety of ways, all of which
involve modifications of conditions under which the family unit would make
decisions concerning more or fewer children--whether the steps are limited
to exhortation and provision of cheaper methods of birth control, or extend
to drastic policy measures affecting the costs of toore children.

On the

other hand, the effects of declining deaths include more than just increase
in numbers of surviving children.

The underlying innovation in health and

medical technology may reduce involuntary
sterility formerly associated with widely prevalent
debilitating diseases; it may raise intra-marital fertility by prolonging
the duration of marriage (within the childbearing span of the wife) through
the reduction of mortality {par,ticularly male) in the procreative ages--just
as it may eventually, through the reduction of uncontrollable and unpredictable
diseases, introduce changes in the outlook of would-be parents on the future
and the role in it of the next generation.

Given the diversity of possible

sources of decisions in response to declining death rates, the variety of
direct and indirect effects of the latter on the birth rate response, and
finally the inadequate knowledge at hand here of the parameters of demographic
processes and of economic and institutional patterns in various LDC regions,
we can attempt only a limited probing.
This is true even if we eliminate from consideration the Communist
societies, in which the power of the single-party, ideologically-motivated,
state government is such that its responses to declining death rates and
accelerating population growth may dominate whatever free responses could have
originated within the population masses of the country.

Such domination is

suggested by the power of intensive propaganda, control over location and

-30migration of the population, disposition over the basic consumer goods,
particularly housing, needed for a growing population, and the like.

I

would find it difficult, for lack of adequate knowledge of societies so
organized, to formulate a rational basis for evaluating the planned response
that the decision-centers at the governmental levels of these countries
W9uld make to declining death rates and rising rates of natural increase.
The same criterion might also lead to exclusion of non-Communist, dictatorially
organized LDCs, in which a similar domination of the state over the free
responses of the population might be expected; but there are no clear relevant
measures at hand for drawing the line.

The purpose of the comment is to

call attention to the possible policy interventions of non-familial, non
blood related groups, particularly those endowed with internal sovereignty.
They may be important in both dictatorially and domocratically organized
societies; but their weight seems more dominant in the former--sufficiently
so to warrant limiting further discussion by concentrating on the societies
with relative freedom of decision by families and related blood groups.
The importance of the wider, blood-related groups that encompass
the individual families is clearly great in LDCs, whether they be the tribal
groupings in much of Africa, the racial-ethnic divisions within many Latin
American countries, or in Asian colllltries where limited inter-marriage
among group{say among castes in India) is still the norm.

In conditions

of relati¥e weakness- and instability, of the country's collective
institutions, particularly of the state, such wider blood-related groups
serve an important function in providing long-term security to individual
families in conditions of group competition within the country.

The

response of a family to declining death rates and more surviving children
would, with reference to the wider-group norms, differ from that of an

individual family within a stable political framework and relying securely
on the protection and stability of a strong government representing the
interests of the community and of all its parts.

An adequate analysis

would require taking specific account of these various blood-related sub
groups within the populations of the several LDC regions in the process of
their reaction to declines in death rates.

But for obvious reasons, our

discussion can take only general cognizance of these sources of influence
on the birth-rate decisions of would-be parents.
We can now face a limited question.

Assume that the individual

families, the pairs of woald-be parents, either experience or observe a
perceptible reduction in death rates, through the reduction of both infant
and childhood mortality and declines in deaths at adult ages.

Under what

conditions would we expect a relatively prompt and full response of birth
rates such as would prevent the rate of natural increase from rising substantiR1ly and over a relatively long period?

These conditions would presumably

bear on (i) the firmness of judgment with respect to continuity (irreversibility)
of the observed declines in ioortality; (ii) the relation of the resulting
numbers of surviving children to the desired numbers; and (iii) the identity
of the population group in a position to realize an effective birth rate

.

response, and the limits of their possible perception of mortality declines.
(i)

Given the emergence of a marked downturn in death rates as a

novel phenomenon for populations and countries that have experienced for
centuries a much higher average level of mortality, and most important, with
instability characterized by sharp short-term declines and equally short
term larger rises, a fairly long period of observation and experience at
lower and stable death rates would be required before a response could be
expected.

This is particularly true at the later stages of the woman's

17

-32childbearing span where a decision to forego another child, in reliance
on the persistence of low death rates for children, may be beyond repair
if the expectation proves false.

How long a period of waiting to test

the persistence of the 11¥Jrtality trend one should reasonably assume, would
.have to be estimated from an analytical case in which all other factors
affecting the decision (except the decline in mortality itself) have been
removed (i.e. held constant)--not an easy task.

A span of well over a

decade seems a minimum, and one could perhaps argue that, ruling out downward revisions in numbers of desired surviving children, a whole generation
might have to pass before the next parental generation could react significantly.
Yet, given the declines in crude death rates averaging between 4 and 5 points
per 1,000 per decade over the last half century (in the LDCs from the mid1920s to the mid-1970s), a lag of only one decade would mean a substantial
addition to the rate of natural increase--which would continue so long as
the death rates continue to decline, even though persistence of the latter
would, as time goes on, raise confidence and reduce the lag.
The judgment of confidence in the continuity and irreversibility of
a new social trend is hardly a factor susceptible of tests for either ex-ante
or post-facto

validity; and one hesitates to assign a large weight to it.

Yet complete neglect of it implies a

neglect of a possi~ly major problem

of the channels by which effective perception of, and response to, of new
social processes are attained within the traditional, and later transitional,
framework of LDCs.

It may well be that a long delay in response to new

trends is a rational reaction, due partly to limitation of information,
partly to lack of resources for taking chances on uncertain trends and for
overcoming the fear of the unknown.

-33(ii)

The conjecture under (i) becomes less relevant if we can

assume that over a long initial period of the decline in mortality in the
LDCs, the desired number of surviving children remains higher than, or in
the neighborhoo d of, the actual number (as perceived by the family).

Given

targets or norms, whether individuall y elaborated or more
realistical ly set as norms in the form of socially approved patterns, whether
hard, or more realistical ly, with soft margins, it is not difficult to see
that beginning at the pre-modem levels of death and birth rates, there
might be a long period of sustained mortality declines--an d yet the resulting
number of surviving children would remain short of, or close to the desired
target, thus providing no incentive for a response-de cline in birth rates.
To begin with, the declines in 100rtality and morbidity permit those
groups in the population that formerly could not reach their fertility targets,
either because of involuntary sterility, or because of

institution al constraints

on remarriage of widows, or other similar consequence s of past mortality
and morbidity, now to start approximati ng them.

Far more important,

quantitativ ely, is the condition of the large economic and social groups
below the narrowly defined top.

Given the rather low rate of natural

increase of LDCs, just prior to the initiation of the recent downtrends
in mortality (of about 0.5 percent in the 1920s), it is reasonable to
suggest that for the majority of the population the numbers of surviving
children was below the desired.

This suggestion is strengthene d if we

assume the earlier conjecture (discussed in Section 2a above), that at the
top economic and social levels in the pre-modern LDCs death rates and rates
of natural increase were substantial ly lower and greater respectivel y than
at the lower levels.

For this would mean a long-persis ting pattern of

association of a much larger number of surviving children with the higher economic
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decades of the declines of death rates in the LDCs--unless there are prompt
and major changes in the desired numbers, a possibility that largely depends
on underlying major changes in the economy and institutions of the country,
a shift at high gear into rodernization that is likely to be the exception
rather than a rule.
If so, a substantial phase of the long-term decline in death rates
in the LDCs would also be a phase of catching up with formerlv nnsnrailahle
potentials of desired number of surviving children.

How iong this catching

up phase, representing lack of incentive for a response of birth rates, would
be is a matter for conjecture.

It might differ from one group of LDCs to

another; and would certainly differ in its historical chronology with
disparities in the historical dates of the initiation of the major mortality
declines among the different groups of LDCs.

But if the natural-increase

differences in pre-modern LDCs were as large as the scattered data on
mortality (and some on fertility, particularly for the

peasant communities)

suggest, being at a minimum 10 points per 1,000, it might take at least two
decades for the catching-up phase to be completed; nor should the oossihi.litu
of a longer period be ruled out.

If so, this phase would largely overlap

with any lag due to lack of confi.dence in the persistence and irreversibility
of the mortaility trends, discussed under (i) above.
(iii)

The perception of a trend such as that in the death rates in the LDCs

in recent decades may be limited to that of major absolute declines--which
were concentrated in the early childhood ages, at one end, and in the advanced
age brackets beyond the early 50s, at the other.

Following the comment

made above, we may ask how the population groups who are in a position to
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affect birth rates, either because they are in the childbearing ages, or
because they exercise influence on the latter, perceive the demographic
trends.

In the LDCs, in the transition period, and outside of the limited

upper circles of government, this is hardly done by scrutinizing aggregative
statistics or observing graphs.

But the answer as to how families and the

blood-related groups to which they may belong attain their perception of
major demographic trends would have to be provided

out of

greater

familiarity with the LDC societies and the mechanism of ascertaining and
diffusing major social data than is possessed here.
One part of the answer is to suggest that reduction in the mortality
of children, sizable only in the very early ages (below 5), are surely
observed by those families in procreative phases of their life cycle that
enjoy the benefits of such decreased 100rtality.

And it may be legitimately

argued that the knowledge of, and reaction to, this part of_the downtrend
in mortality could be expected to be more direct and potentially affective
(other conditions being favorable) than the knowledge of, and reaction to,
the decline in mortality at the advanced adult ages.

It would also follow

that if the knowledge of trends is extrapolated into the future, in the
process of formulating birth decisions, the reduction in early childhood
mortality would be far more likely to form the basis for such an extra
polation than the changes at the advanced adult ages--which would relate
to the role of children four or five decades after their birth.

To be sure,

neglecting these latter, as we do in the statistical illustration that follows,
means neglecting the insurance motive of assuring survival of children to
ages when they could support the old parents.

But granted this limitation,

it is of interest to explore what an instantaneous

and complete response

to declines in mortality at the early childhood ages would mean Dr the

-36movements of the rates of natural increase.
The estimates of what may be designated the offset response of birth
rates to declines in death rates, presented in Table 5, are based on two
assumptions :

that the response is to reduction in death rates at ages

under 5; that the response is prompt and full, allowing for no lag in the
process.
the first.

Both assumptions are unrealistic , the second far more so than
But the result is an extreme version of a full major response

of birth rates; and it is of interest, in deriving it, to compare it with
the actual movement of the birth rates and the trend in the rates of natural
increase.
Given these assumptions , we need measures of the decline not only
in crude death rates for total population, but also of that in the death
rates of the population 0-4.

Panel A of Table 5 summarizes the results

of utilizing the rich data in the UN Working Paper repeatedly used here,
which shows for individual countries and for regions not only crude birth
and death rates and total population at quinquennia l intervals beginning
with 1950, but also the proportions , in total population, of the 0-4 group
(as well as of other age groups, 5-14, etc).

On the reasonable premise

that all these domographic parameters are consistent with each other, it
is possible to derive, by comparing the cumulated crude birth rates over
quinquenniu m related to total population at mid-point of the period with
the surviving 0-4 population at the end of thequinquen nium (related tQ_rJ-iP
population at the end of the quinquennium ) what the proportiona l attrition
{per 1,000) was.

If the population is closed, with no emigration or im

migration, this attrition rate is identical with the crude death rate
for the 0-4 group.

Given th~size of the regions that we deal with, and the

demonstrate d closeness between the growth rates in total population and
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Estimated Offset Response of Birth Rates to Declines in Death
Rates of Children 0-4, 1950-55 to 1970-75, The Four LDC Regions
of Table 4

Panel A.

The Relevant Demographic Parameters
(per 1,000 of underlying population)
Middle
East

Subsah.
Africa

(1)

(2)

(3)

Proportion of 0-4
to total pop. 1950

153

164

2.

Ditto, 1955

162

3.

CRNI, 1950-55

4.

0-4 population in 1955
as proportion of total
in 1950 (per 1,000)

East and
M.S. Asia

Latin
America

All
Four

(4)

(5)

170

169

160

169

180

178

168

18.9

24.7

20.1

28.5

21.1

178.3

190.9

198. 8

204. 9

186.5

44.1

47.1

48.1

43.7

45.0

Data for 1950-55
1.

5.

CBR, 1950-55

6.

CBR in line 5>shifted
to the base of 1950

46.26

50.06

51. 18

46. 88

47.41

Cumulative births, 195055, as proportion of 1950
population

247.8

276.6

283.5

257.5

260.5

Attrition (death rate)
per 1,000 of 0-4 popul
ation in 1950-.S, per year
(from lines 4 and 7)

63.0

71.4

68.0

42.5

64.1

CDR, total population,
1950-55

25.2

22.4

28.6

15.2

23.9

Prop. 0-4 to total
population, 1970

169

173

178

171

171

11.

Ditto, 1975

167

171

181

167

170

12.

CRNI, 1970-75

25.4

28.3

25.8

29.7

26.4

13.

0-4 pop. in 1975
as prop. of total
in 1970

190. 3

196.8

205.6

193.3

193. 7

7.

8.

9.

Data for 1970-75
10.
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M.S.Asia
(1)

Middle
East
(2)

Subs ah.
Africa
(3)

Latin
America
(4)

All
Four
(5)

14.

CBR, 1970-75

41.9

43.1

47.6

38.9

42.4

15-

CBR, to the base
of 1970 population

44.51

46.19

50.73

41.85

45.25

Cumulative births, 1970-5
as prop. of 1970 populat. 240.8

252.9

280.7

230.0

247.7

Attrition (death rate)
of popul. 0-4, in 1970-5

45.4

48.1

59.8

33.3

47.4

CDR, 1970.. 75

16.5

14.8

21.8

9.2

16.0

16.
17.
18.

B.

19.

Derivation of Offset-Response in Birth Rates to Decline in Death
Rates of 0-4 Population
(all entries per 1,000 of relevant population)

Decline in death rates
of 0-4 population from
1950-5 to 1970-5

17.6

23.3

8.2

9.2

16.7

Proportion of 0-4
population to total
at initial date

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.17

Decline in death rates
of 0-4 population
related to total pop.
(line 19x line 20)=
full-offset response

3.0

4.0

1.5-

1.7

2.8

22.

Observed decline in CBR

2.2

4.0

4.8

2.6

23.

Observed change in CRNI

+6.5

+3.6

+5.7

+1.2

+5.3

24.

Derived change in CRNI
with full offset-response +5.7

+3.6

+5.3

+4.3

+5.1

20.

21.

Notes
All the underlying data are from the UN working paper, cited and used in
connection with Tables 2 and 3.
Panel A--lines 4 and 13:

The estimates are the proportions in lines 2 and

11, raised by the cumulative growth of population (cumulative natural increase)
over the quinquennium, using the entries in lines 3 and 12 respectively.

-39Panel A--lines 6 and 15:

The estimates use the rise of the base (total)

population, but over half rather than the full quinquennium (as it was used for
lines 4 and 13).
Panel A--lines 8 and 17:

Tile entries in lines 4 and 7, and 13 and 16

respectively, were used first to derive attrition (deaths) as the difference
between lines 7 and 4, and 13 and 6, related to the initial base (1950 and 1970
respectively) and representing the proportion over the quinquennium.

Then the

population was adjusted for a shift from the 1950 or 1970 base to the 1950-55
and 1970-75, using the entries for 0-4 population in lines 1 and 4, and 10 and
13 respectively.

The adjusted proportions, now to the base of 1950-55 and 1970-75

respectively, were then converted into per year declines in death rates, related
to total population.
Panel B--for the rationa1esee discussion in the text.
difference between lines 8 and 17 of Panel A.

Line 20 is based on the shares

a shown in lines 1 and 4, and 10 and 13 of Panel A.
the observed CBRs in lines 3 and 14 of Panel A.
observed CRNis in lines 3 and 12 of Panel A.

Line 19 is the

Line 22 was derived from

Line 23 was derived from the

Line 24 equals line 23 reduced

by the excess of line 21 over line 22 (or raised by the shortage of line 21
relative to line 22).

-40the rates of natural increase, it seemed justified to identify the attribution
rates thus calculated with death rates relating to the 0-4 population.

The

estimates are clearly approximate, but the resulting orders of magnitude are
plausible.
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With the results in Panel A, which show the declines in death rates of
0-4 population between 1950-55 and 1970-75, and the proportions of that
population in the total at the start of each quinquennium, we can estimate
what the offset-response of birth rates would be--on the assumption that
birth rates would decline, without any lag, to offset fully the experienced
reduction in childhood deaths (Panel B).

It will be noted that the derived

response was only somewhat larger than the actual decline in birth rates,
in three of the four LDC regions--a rough agreement which, however, cannot
be interpreted to mean that the observed drop in the birth rates did represent
the assumed offset-response.

It could well have been due to a substantial

decline in birth rates of the top economic and social groups, only partly
offset by the constancy or slight rise in birth rates among the lower
economicgroups.

In Latin America, the observed decline in birth rates,

of almost 5 points, greatly exceeded the derived offset of 1.7 points;
and this finding is plausible, considering the much longer period over which
declines in mortality occurred in Latin America, and the greater movement
toward the demographic transition that began to affect the birth rates.
But the major aspect of the finding in Panel Bis that even if we
assume full and instantaneous response to declines in childhood mortality,
such a response will not be sufficient to prevent a major rise in the rate
of natural increase.

As

line 24 shows, the derived rate of natural increase

shown a substantial rise over the two decade span in all of the four LDC
regions.

-41The results are as one would have expected.

If the birth rates

respond to declines in childhood mortality alone, the rates of natural increase
will be raised by the declines in mortality in ages above those of childhood-
and largely by reduced mortality in the advanced adult ages.· If we were to
allow for effects of deaths also of children 5 years and age and over, there
would have been a somewhat larger, but not much larger offset response.

If,

as partial data indicate, total deaths of children under 15 were only about
60 percent of total deaths, while the share of the 0-14 group ranged about
42 percent of total population, the implicitly 100re moderate decline of
death rates for 5-14 than for the .0-4 populations, might, if taken into
account, raise the estimated offset decline in line 21 by about a tenth,
but not more than that.
The major conclusion is that if it is largely childhood deaths that
affect the birth rate response, then even the full and prompt response (neither
likely)

would still be insufficient to prevent a substantial rise in the

rates of natural increase.

Under the assumed conditions, the latter

will cease rising only when the death rates above the childhood ages
cease declining.

Or to put the conclusion in its converse form.

While

death rates are declining, sharply and with the usual concentration in
early and advanced ages, the possibility of avoiding large rises in the
rates of natural increase would lie not so much in a response of birth
rates to childhood mortality--a most likely response, yet even so not
promptly or fully--but in changing conditions that would affect the total
· number of desired surviving children.

Such changes in conditions are not

automatically provided by declines in death rates and by those factors
behind them that appeared to have been operative in the case of LDCs in
recent decades.

On

the contrary, the conjectures under (ii) suggest a long

-42initial period in the decline of death rates when the desired number of
surviving children may continue to remain above that yielded byfle
clining childhood mortality levels.

But what are the implications of our discussion of the responses of
birth rates to the declines in death rates?

At the end of the preceding

sub-section, which dealt with the declines in death rates, we came to a
rather uncertain conclusion as to the effects of the greater declines in
death rates among the lower economic and social groups than among the upper
groups, forwhom death rates were already appreciably lower because of better
nutrition, housing, etc.

We argued that prolongation of life, and closer

convergence of death rates among various economic and social groups, removed
one major aspect of long-term inequality.

This reduction could be offset by

greater pressure of higher rates of population growth on scarce traditional
resources, unless such pressure was relieved by economic and social innovations
associated with modern economic growth.

We add now the conclusion that even with

full and prompt offset response of birth rates to declines in death rates of
0-4 population, there will be acceleration of rates of natural increase; and
such acceleration will be greater among those groups for whom the declines in
death rates were the greater, i.e. among the lower economic and social strata.
And this should mean that instead of a positive association between economic
and social levels and group rates of natural increase, the trends discussed
will produce an inverse association between economic and social levels and
the rates o.f natural increase.

But this does not imply a necessary widening

of per capita income inequalities if we deal with long-term levels of life
cycle income--which will now be sustained by the longer span over which life
and productivity can now be maintained among the lower income groups, as they
could not be so maintained in the pre-transition past.

The conclusion is

-43still uncertain; but one may argue that both the trends in the birth rates
and the trends in income inequality depend heavily on economic and social
transformation that relieve the pressure of growing population on the scarcity
of traditional resources, and that induce downtrends in the birth rates
over and beyond those derivable as offset responses to declines in childhood
mortality.
This latter argument could be developed further by indicating that
the technological innovations associated with modern economic growth, which
are the main source of the economic advance, depend heavily upon new
knowledge; and that they and the associated social innovations require a
much greater emphasis on higher levels of education and training of the
younger generation that would be carrying the innovational process further.
Once this connection between investment in the younger generation and further
economic and social advance is established, the shift toward greater invest
ment by the older generation in the young (away from the earlier pattern
of the younger generation contributing to their elders within the wider
family) will take place,
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and there will be a resulting change in the

number of desired surviving children, with its major effects on the birth
rates.

The important link in this argument is between the sources of

economic advance and the needed contribution of the younger generation if
these sources are to be maintained--a contribution that demands the greater
investment in education and training.

And it is in this connection that a

decline in death rates of the type that occurred in LDCs in recent decades
looms as an indispensable condition.

How the eventually resulting declines

in birth rates develop, whether they begin at the top and how rapidly they
spread through the wider groups in the population, are questions and
possibilities of obvious bearing upon income distribution while the

-44transition process is taking place.

But these arguments take us well

beyond the immediate impacts of the death rate trends in the LDCs, the
major so far observed movement.

And it would require more analysis of

the differential death rate movements and of the related movements in
birth rates to permit adequate discussion of the wider inter-connectio ns
just suggested.
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Economic Losses Represented by Deaths:
Exploratory Illustrations

The appendix is devoted to illustrative exploration of economic
losses represented by deaths, with special attention to the differences
between the high death rates of the LDCs and the much lower mortality
of the DCs.

The discussion is directly relevant to the effects of

the major declines of the death rates in the LDCs, emphasized in the
text.

But in view of the complexity, and the difficulty of arriving

at defensible approximations, even of the order of magnitudes, it
seemed best to shift the exploration to a separate appendix.
The discussion is limited to direct economic costs or losses.

No

attempt is, or can be, made to attach magnitudes to the psychological
and emotional effects of death upon members of the family.

Nor can

we deal with indirect negative effects, e.g., the greater unpredictability
and variability over time of mortality in condition of limited control
over disease.
An even more important exclusion is the neglect of the association
between high death rates and high levels of morbidity--i.e., incidence
of disease, apart from higher mortality.

Given this association, the

level of death rates is clearly suggestive of the level of morbidity;
and higher incidence of disease either in childhood or in adult ages
would presumably have negative effects on productivity, either because of
lasting debilitating effects of an earlier disease (even if incurred in
childhood) or because of direct impact and consequences of such diseases
affecting adults in working ages.

Any attempt to measure the losses so

involved in LDCs, in comparison with those in the DCs, would run into
the difficulty of separating the effects of health conditions from those

-46of nutrition and other components of the standard of living.

But it is

reasonable to assume that these losses from higher morbidity associated
with higher death rates in the LDCs are significantly greater than similar
relative losses in the DCs.

If so, the comparison of economic losses

suggested by deaths in the discussion that follows underestimates the
excess relative loss in the less developed countries.
In dealing here with direct economic losses debited to deaths, we
use for illustration the relevant demggraphic data for 1937 for two
countries, Egypt and the Netherlands (see App. Table, Panel A).

With

further search, we probably could have found the data for a wider contrast
with respect to death rates, crude and age-specific.

But the contrast ob

served in Panel A in the crude death rates, between 27.3 per 1,000 for
Egypt and less than 9 per 1,000 for the Netherlands, is sufficiently wide
for our purposes,

The purpose here is to suggest the wider ramifications

of the comparison with respect to the economic losses involved--rather
than attempt a full estimate of the orders of magnitude.
A glance at the age specific death rates in columns 3 and 6 of
Panel A reveals that these rates are higher in Egypt than in the Netherlands
for each age-class distinguished; that the ratios of the age-specific
death rates in Egypt to those in Netherlands tend to be higher in the
early ages than at the later, the decline in these ratios interrupted
only by the extremely high ratio for the 1-4 years old age class; and
that the greater share of the younger age groups, particularly below 15,
in the total population, in Egypt than in the Netherlands, tends to
accentuate the disparity in the crude death rates.

Whatever losses are

represented by deaths are bound to be much greater in the high death rate
country like Egypt, at least in relation to its total economic magnitude,
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than in a low death-rate country like the Netherlands.

It also follows

that if the recent major declines in the LDCs proceeded on the path
suggested in the tex~with larger declines among the lower economic
and social groups with initially much higher mortality than among the
more favored, upper economic groups, the resulting convergence within
the country among group death-rates would mean also convergence in
the relative burden of losses represented by deaths.

But how do we

estimate, as a first approximation, the direct economic losses that
deaths represent?
Two different approaches may be followed.

In the first, the losses

represented by deaths would be defined as inputs into past consumption of
children and young adults offset by productive contributions that the
deceased might have made.

The question that is being answered is, then,

what unoffset consumption inputs might have been avoided if the children
and young adults whose death we are considering would never have been born.
In the other approach, the losses represented by deaths are viewed as the
projected net productive contribution of the deceased that could have
been expected but for the irreversible loss.

This is the lost opportuni

ties, rather than the lost costs, approach; but both deal with only economic
costs, opportunities, and returns, not with the psychic.

We follow here

the first approach, carried through more easily and dealing with histori
cal facts and incurred burdens, rather than with extrapolated possibilities
19
and lost future opportunities.
Panel B-1, columns 1 and 3, reveals that total childhood deaths in
a year account for 1.7 percent of total population in Egypt, but only
0.117 percent in the Netherlands(lin e 18)---a ratio of over 14 to 1.
To estimate the input in these children to whose death we are trying to
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Economic Losses Implicit in Death Rates, An Illustrative
Calculation, Egypt and The Netherlands, 1937
A. Distributions of Population and Deaths by
Age Classes, and the _\ge-Specific Death Rates.

The Netherlands

E.gy£t
% share
pop.by
age
(1)

)

% share.

deaths
by age
(2)

ASDR
per
1,000

% share

pop. by
age

(3)

(4)

% share
deathS
by age
(5)

ASDR
per
1,000
(6)

3.1

26.5

234.4

2.2

8.6

34.3

1-4

10.2

29.5

78.9

8.1

2.6

2.8

3.

5-9.

14.0

3.9

7.6

9.8

1.2

1.1

4.

10-14

12.1

2.0

4.5

9.2

0.9

0.9

5.

0-14

39.4

61.9

29.3

13.3

6.

15-24

15.4

3.2

5.6

17.8

3.1

1.5

7.

25-34

15.7

4.4

7.7

15.4

3.6

2.1

8.

35-44

13.1

4.9

10.1

13.0

4.8

3.2

9.

45-54

8.3

4.5

14.7

10.3

7.7

6.6

10.

55-64

4.5

4.1

24.8

7.5

14.4

16.9

11.

15 -64

57.0

21.1

64.0

33.6

12.

65 and over

3.6

17.0

6.7

53.1

13.

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

1.

Below 1

2.

(

127.2
27.27

69.6
8.78

B-1. Economic Losses from Childhood Mortality
Deaths,%
of Total
Popula.
(1)

Egypt
Loss
Multiple
(2)

Loss,%
of 100

cu

(3)

The Netherlands
Loss
Deaths,%
Multiof Total
ple
Popula.
(5)
(4)

Loss,%
of 100

cu

(6)

14. Below 1

0. 7266

0.25

0.1817

0.0755

0.25

0.0189

15. 1-4

0.8048

1.50

1.2072

0.0227

1.50

0.0340

16. 5-9

0.1064

3.75

0.3990

0.0108

3.75

0.0405

17. 10-14

0.0545

6.25

o. 3406

0.0083

6.25

0.0519

18. 0-14

1.6923

2.1205
(2.681)

0.;1173

0.1453
(0.174)
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B-2. Residual Economic Losses, Adult Mortality
The Netherlands

Egypt
Deaths,
% of Total
Population
(1)

Assumed
Output per
Pers. (CU)

Resid. Cost
Begin. of
Age Class
CU's

Res id.
Loss,
! of
100 cu

Death;

Output

Resid.
Cost

(6)

(7)

(8)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Resj
Los

Age Class
19. 15-24

0.0862

1.000

7.50

0. 6465

0.0267

1.000

7.50

0.20(

20. 25-34

0.1209

1.322

7.50

o. 7121

0.0327

1.224

7.50

0. 20E

21. 35-44

0.1323

1.644

4.28

0.1402

0.0416

1.449

5.26

0.12~

1.644

-2.16

1.449

0.77

22. 45-54
23. Total

1.4988
(1. 888)

24. Total, for Panels
B-1, and B-2, % of
total product

4.57

Notes
Panel A
The data used here are taken, or calculated, from United Nations,
Demographic Yearbooks, 1949-1950, and 1951.

New York, 1950 and 1951.

The distribution of the population by age for Egypt is for late March
1937, and is from the 1949-50 Yearbook, Table 4, pp. 104 ff; that for the
Netherlands is the average of the percentage shares for 1930 and 1945,
from the same table.
portionately.

The small fraction of age-unknown is allocated pro

The distribution of deaths by age is from United Nations,

Demographic Yearbook, 1951, New York 1951, Table 16, pp. 216 ff; and relates to the deaths in 1937 for both countries.
The age specific death rates in column 3 are derived by relating the
absolute numbers of deaths to the relevant population; but the multipli
cation of the ratio of column 2 to column 1 by the crude death rate

o. 53]
(O. 63E
0.81

-soAppendix Table 1 continued
Notes (continued)
(line 13, col. 3) yields identical results, except for errors of rounding.
The age-specific death rates in col. 6 were derived by multira.ying the
ratio of col. 5 to col. 4, by the crude death rate in line 13, col. 6
(8.78).
Panel B-1, Cols 1 and 4
The entries were derived by multiplying the age-specific death rates
(see Panel A, cols. 3 and 6), expressed as proper fractions, by the per
centage share of the age-class in total population (see Panel A, col. 1
and 4).
Panel B-1, cols. 2 and 5
Entries calculated on three assumptions.

(a) Consumption per child

is 0.5 of that for the adult in working ages (15-64).

(b) Total income

of the country is the sum of all consumption units, the latter being 0.5
per child; 1.00 per adult in working ages; 0.75 per adult aged 65 and over.
(c) The number of years within the lifespan of the children dying is 0.5,
3.0, 7.5, and 12.5 respectively for the successive age class under 15--
representing linear interpolation and cumulation of the age-class limits.
The entries in cols 2 and 5 are then the products of 0.5 by the number of
years.
Panel B-1, cols. 3 and 6
The entries are the products of those in cols. 1-2, and 4-5---for lines
14-17; and direct sums in line 18.
The entries in parentheses in line 8, cols. 3 and 6, are the total
loss related. to the total number of consuming units.
sumptions stated above, the latter total for Egypt is:

Based on the as
(39.4%) (0.5) +

(57.0%)(1.0) + (3.6%)(0.75) = 79.4; and for the Netherlands, using a
similar equation---83.675.

Division by these totals used as proper

fractions (to 100) yields the percentages in the parentheses.
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Notes (continued)

Panel B-2, cols. 1 and 5
These again are the products of the age specific death rates by the
proportion of the age class iu total population, both being taken from
Panel A (see notes to Panel A, cols. 1 and 4).
Panel B-2, cols. 2 and 6
The life cycle pattern of product per person in the working ages (and
also for age 65 and over) is based on the following assumptions.

(a) The

product per person in age 65 and over is 0.75 CU, just sufficient to
cover consumption.

It follows that the product per person for ages 15-64

must cover more than the per person CU, to compensate for the consumption
of children under 15.

The average excess in per person product in ages

15-64 is given by the ratio of all consumption units for people under
65 to the number of people in working ages (i.e. for Egypt, [(39.4 x 0.5) +
(57.0 x 1.0)] divided by 57.0; for the Netherlands - [(29.3 x 0.5) +
(64.0 x 1.0)] divided by 64.0.

(b) It is assumed that in the age class

15-24 product per person just equals consumption, i.e., 1.0; that there
is a peaking plateau in ages 35-44 and 45-54, per person product being
equally high in the two age classes; and that in the intermediate age
classes (25-34 and 55-64), the per person product is a simple average
of the preceding and following class means.

Given assumptions (a) and

(b), it is possible to solve one-variable equation to find the value
of the peak level (which proves to be 1.644 in Egypt and 1.449 in the
Netherlands), and thus of all the lower class product

per person.

-52Appendix Table 1 continued
Notes (continued)

Panel B-2, cols. 3 and 7
The initial value here is the product of 0.5 CU (consumptio n per per
son per year) by 15, the number of years elapsing to the beginning of the
15-24 age class.

From then on the cumulated past costs are affected by

the surplus of product over assumed consumption in the successive age
classes of adults in working ages---the surplus being the difference
between the enries in cols. 2 and 6, and 1.00.
Panel B-2, cols. 4 and 8
The entries are product of the entries in col. 1 and 4, by the
average of those in cols. 3 and 7 (e.g., for line 20, it would be the
average of 7.50 and 4.28, in col. 4; and of 7.50 and 5.26 in col. 8)--
all of this for lines 19 through 22.
For entries in lines 23 and 24, whether the sums in top lines or in
the parentheses , see notes to the relevant part of Panel B-1.
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assign an economic weight, we are assuming that the annual consumption
per child

of the consumption of an adult in the working

amounted to 0.5

ages; that the productive contribution of children was negligible and
no offset to the input of past costs is to be entered; that with stable
prices, there was no rise over time in per capita consumption of the
adult in the working ages; and that with savings minimal (and disregarded
for simplicity), total income (or net product of the nation) was the
sum of all consumption (calculated by asigning 1.0 per adult in working
ages, 0.50 to those below 15, and 0.75 to those 65 and over).

Given

these assumptions, and cumulation of inputs in children whose death
occurred beyond year 0, we can calculate the cost as percentage of
total current product.

It works out to 2.68 percent for Egypt and 0.17

percent for the Netherlands (see line 18, cols. 3 and 6, in parentheses).
It is of interest to compare the results in Appendix Table 1 with
those in Hansen's note (see footnote 19),

which reports similar

measures for India, compared with those for U.K. and USA, for 1931 and
1951 (see Appendix Table'2).
The comparison with the results here confirms the general orders of
~gnitude, and indicates how differences in the assumed child-adult con
sumption ratios affect the cost of childhood mo'rtality expressed as per
centage of total product.

While we have assumed here the child-adult

consumption ratio of 0.5, adults defined as people in the working ages
(and with the consumption level per person of 65 and over set at 0.75),
the resulting cost estimate for Egypt, at 2.7 percent, is close to that
for India, either in 1931 or 1951, see lines 3-4, col. 1).

And the intro

duction of a somewhat greater consumption allowance for the age group 10-14
in India does not change the cost estimate significantly (see lines 5-6,
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Appendix Table 2
Major Results of Hansen's Calculations
of Costs of Childhood Deaths
India

U.K.

USA

(1)

(2)

(3)

1. 1931

1.58

0.17

0.18

2. 1951

1. 31

0.07

0.08

3. 1931

2.81

0.26

o. 32

4. 1951

2.83

0.07

0.09

5. 1931

2.78

0.35

0.40

6. 1951

2.82

0.09

0.12

Deaths before age 15
% of Total Poulation

Costs of Childhood
Deaths,Child-Adult
Cons. Ratio Set at
0.5

Cost of Childhood
Deaths,Child-Adult
Cons. Ratio Variable

Notes
Taken or calculated from Tables 2 and 3, pp. 259-260, of the paper
cited in footnote 19.
The cost of childhood deaths are expressed in percentages of the
country's total product, equated to aggregate consumption.
The variable child-adult consum,ption ratios in lines .S and 6 were as
follows.

For India, the ratio was set at 0.5 through age class 5-9, and

at 0.8 for age class 10-14.

For UK and USA, the ratios for the fou·r

successive age classes (the same as used here) were 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9.
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col. 1).

In contrast, the introduction of higher child-adult consumption

ratios for UK and US raises the cost estimates by a substantial propor
tion (from 0.26 to 0.35 in UK in 1931, and from 0.32 to 0.40 for USA,
in the same year; the proportional changes in 1951 are almost as great,
see columns 2 and 3, lines 3-6).

Yet, even with the allowance for much

higher consumption levels (relative to adults) of children in UK and
USA, the relative costs of childhood deaths for India are still much
greater in 1931 and 1951.
But if deaths of children represent an economic loss, because of
past input of resources in their consumption that cannot be recovered, the

same is true of the deaths of adults in working ages---so long as the sur
plus of their contribution to product beyond their own consumption fails
to cover past historical costs incurred in raising them to productive ages.
This is the rationale for Panel B-2 of Appendix Table 1, in which the
cumulative input in past consumption (at 0.5 units until age 15, and at
1.0 through the successive ages, until 65) is compared with the cumulative
total output credited to the adults.
two assumptions:

The latter output is estimated on

(a) that it is the adult population of working age, 15-

64, who produce the goods sufficient for their consumption and that of
children under 15; (b) that within the working lifespan, output per
person in age 15-24 just equals per capita consumption (i.e., 1.0); that
the peak per capita output is a plateau in ages 35-44 and 45-54; and that
per capita product in the intermediate age classes (i.e., 25-34 and 5564) is at an arithmetic mean of the per capitas in the preceding and

following age classes.

This is clearly only a rough approximation to the

life cycle of product per adult; but some such pattern is needed for a
proper view of the time span within which the accumulated excess of output
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over consumption begins to match the accumulated past input into con
sumption--- for the proportion of population that dies and for whom full
recovery of past costs cannot be attained.
The results of the estimates in Panel B-2 (for details of the
procedure see the notes to the table) suggest that for Egypt the costs of
mortality in the past-costs-r ecovering adult ages adds an item equivalent
to 2 percent of product, raising the total past costs of childhood and
early adult mortality to 4.6 percent (see lines 23-24, col. 4).

For

Netherlands , the addition, while smaller absolutely (0.64 percent), is
far greater relative to cost of childhood mortality.

This is due to the

much greater weight of costs in col. 7, lines 19-22 than in col. 5 of
lines 14-17; whereas total mortality (in percent of total population) in
ages 15-44, of 0.1010 (see col. 5, lines 19-21) is not much lower than
the correspondi ng total of 0.1173 for ages 0-14 (see line 18, col. 4).
Only further exploration , involving many more countries, would reveal
whether the approximati on to unrequited past costs represented by child
hood and early adult mortality (introduced by the estimates in Panel B-2)
is typical of less developed and developed countries respectivel y.

But

there is one aspect of the estimates underlying Panel B-2 that is likely
to be typical, and deserves explicit note.

If the adult population in

working ages is assumed to produce sufficientl y to cover both its own
consumption and that of the population in ages 0-14, the average per
head output for the adult working-age population of Egypt would have to
be 76.7/57.0 = 1.346; whereas that for the Netherlands would have to be
78.65/64.0 = 1.229.

In other words, the excess output demanded from

adults in working ages in Egypt is proportiona tely greater than that de
manded from the adult working ages in the Netherlands .

This is a re-
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flection of the dependency ratio which, whether or not we exclude de
pendency in ages of 65 and over (it was excluded by our assumption),
is significantly greater in LDCs than in the DCs.

The source lies in

the higher ratio of children to adults in the working ages---which, for
Egypt, amounted to 39.4/57.0 or 0.69; whereas in the Netherlands it
was 29.3/64.0 or 0.46.

It is the difference in these two ratios, com

bined with assumptions concerning the life cycle pattern of product
per person within the working age~ that results in a contrast, at the
peak plateau, between an output index of 1.664 for Egypt and 1.449 for
the Netherlands.

The implicit question is whether, given average levels

of productivity, it is possible to muster such a high excess ratio; or
whether, in order to achieve the latter, the whole average level of output
in the productive ages would have to be lowered.

If both the child-adult

consumption ratios, and the proportions of children to working age adults
are

fixed, the adjustment may be either in the average level of the

product, or in the pattern; md if the pattern is fixed, the adjustment
is limited to the average level---involving implicitly the lowering of
consumption for both children and adults.
Assuming for purposes of argument, that the results in both Panels
B-1 and B-2 can be viewed as typical, what importance can be assigned to
the indicated differences in the economic costs of childhood and early
adult mortality between a less developed and more developed country?

The

answer can be suggested only after we take a brief account of the major
omissions in the calculations, even allowing (as Hansen did) for a higher
child-adult consumption ratio in a developed than in a less developed
country.
The first major omission is neglect of the contribution of the mother's
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engagement in pregnancy, birth, and the immediate burdens of care in
infancy---the cost estimates here relating only to the consumption of
goods and services by children.

The weight of such omission would vary

even among less developed countries depending on institutional practices
and the role of women in productive activity; and it is not clear that
differences in the weight of this particular cost component can be sur
mised in comparisons between less developed and developed countries (such
costs always viewed as proportions of some over-all economic product
magnitude).

It clearly adds to the absolute costs of childhood mortality

in both groups of countries; and thus adds to the accumulated costs that
would have to be debited against the output in the early working ages (in
estimating the costs of deaths at those age levels); but we have no basis
here for any plausible comparisons.
The second omission is of a possible allowance for effects of growth
in per capita product on the estimate of past costs embodied in economic
loss from childhood (or young adult) mortality.

If such growth does

occur, the current burden is lessened since past consumption of children
and younger adults is lower in proportion to current per person consumption;
and hence in relation to current product.

Here the difference in this

respect between LDCs, with their higher and steadier rates of growth in
per capita product, is clearly in favor of thelatter---reducing more
appreciably the proportion of past costs to current output.

The mag

nitudes, and their differences as between LDCs and DCs, could be calculated
using assumptions now used in Appendix Table 1, and introducing illus
trative rates of past growth in per capita product.
The third omission, of potentially large magnitude, is that of fore
gone yields on past costs.

These yields are possible even if we retain
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the over-simplified assumption, which equates total product with total con
sumption, and thus neglects savings and capital completely.

Even under

such conditions, were it have been_possible to dispense with past con
sumption of children or young adults whose deaths we are -evaluating, the
consumption of surviving adults would have been greater---with effects
on productivity, which would be likely to have been greater in LDCs
than in the DCs.

This greater consumption foregone would have meant

also greater productivity in the past---a loss that presumably would be
in terms of current product, proportionately greater in LDCs than in the
DCs.

An alternative way to evaluate this omission is to allow for

interest yield on past costs, and for the presence of capital returns
in the economy.

If for the sake of an illustration, we allow for an

addition of returns on capital equal to a quarter of total consumption,
and use of a 5% return rate on past consumption in children viewed as an
investment, the application of these rates to cols. 2-3 and 5-6, lines 14-17
in Panel B-1, would yield an estimate of accumulated losses (to age 15)
of 3.5014 in col. 3 for Egypt and of 0.2165 in col. 6 for the Netherlands--
which with rough allowance for the rise in the total product demoninators
by 25 percent---would work out to percentages of 3.528 and 0.207 respectively,
a wider contrast than between the entries in parentheses in line 8, columns
3 and 6.

This would also affect estimates of losses in the younger adult

age classes in Panel B-2.
Finally, there is a question similar to that discussed in the text
in connection with the focus of decision in the response of birth rates
to the declines in death rates.

Here the question is as to who bears the

costs of childhood mortality, or the residual losses involved in the death
of adults in the younger working ages.

The question may not be relevant
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for the economy as a whole.

But if we are concerned with differential im

pacts of these losses on different economic and social groups within the
population, the question of the identity of the bearer becomes relevant.
Thus, in many developed countries, the state, in various ways, assumes
part of the.costs of children and young adults, i.e., part of their con
sumption--even if it may finance the activity from taxes on the income
of adults and families, with the burden falling perhaps more on the high
er income families.

Thus, also, in many less developed countries, there

may be sharing of such costs within the larger blood group, rather than
the costs falling fully on the individual family unit.

These comments

suggest that the question of how the economic losses of mortality have
been shared involves complicated effects of benefits and incidence of
taxes in those developed societies where the state assumes increasing re
sponsibility; of separation or jointness between the parental family and
that of the next generation (bearing particularly on the locus of mor
tality costs for the younger age classes within the working lifespan);
and of the relation between the single family, no matter how widely de
fined, and the wider blood-related group of which it may be a member.
It is not feasible here to explore the variety of omissions just
indicated and to probe the interrelated and intricate questions that
they suggest.

The discussion of differential costs of mortality, like

that of the offset-response of birth rates to declines in death rates,
emphasizes that the analysis must take account of the wide variety of
institutional economic and social groupings that frame the impact of
losses involved in deaths at different ages or that shape the response
of birth rates to declines in mortality.

With inadequate data to indi

cate the differences in the framework among various groups of LDCs and
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DCs, and with limited command over the monogr aphic literat ure, the
probing had to be limited and constra ined by oversim plifyin g assump tions.
Despite these limitat ions, the discuss ion above is, I believe ,
suffici ent to sugges t the minimum relativ e magnitu des of the losses
represe nted by deaths of childre n and younge r adults- --and the large
differe nces in these losses between DCs and LDCs on the eve of the
recent major downtre nds of the death rates in LDCs.

The propor tionate

losses represe nted by the death rates in the LDCs relatin g to childre
n
and the younge r adults approx imate at least 5 percen t of the curren t
produc t, compare d with probab ly less than a fifth of that propor tion
in
the develop ed countr ies; and reasona ble adjustm ents of these shares ,
to
take accoun t of the omissio ns, could easily raise these minima l ratios
to twice their indicat ed levels.
Compar isons of LDCs and DCs are only sugges tive of compar isons within
a less develop ed country between the mortal ity experie nce of the lower
econom ic and social groups and that of the higher , more favorab ly situate
d.
Yet given the possib ility of substa ntial intra-L DC differe nces in mortal
ity,
associa ted in pre-192 0s largely with dispar ities in econom ic and social
status , one can reasona bly assume that in those earlie r decades the
burden of econom ic losses of mortal ity were much heavie r relativ e to
the consum ption and income levels of the lower income groups than they
D

were for the upper econom ic and social groups; and that the converg ence
in death rates, and reducti on in over-a ll levels , associa ted with the
recent techno logical breakth roughs in contro l of death and of public
health , meant also reducti on in the inequa lity of the burden of relativ
e
losses of mortal ity at these differe nt econom ic and social levels.

And

one must repeat, in conclu sion, the comment made at the outset , concern
ing
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the signific ance of death rates as indexes of morbidi ty; and of the
possible direct effects of declinin g and converg ing morbidi ty rates on
related disparit ies in product ivity among the various economic and
social groups within a less develope d country as it benefits from de
clining mortalit y.

-63FOOTNOTES

1

See "Demographi c Aspects of the Size Distributio n of Income,"

Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 25, no. 1, October 1976,
pp. 1-94.
2
We prefer to emphasize the total for LDCs, excluding China.

The

estimates for the latter for pre-1950s were always subject to debate;
and there has been ever greater scarcity of data for China after the 1950s.
Yet the estimated population for the country accounted for two-tenths of
world population for 1975, and about three-tenth s of the population total
for the LDCs.
3

The quinquennium 1970-75 and the estimate for 1975 are described

even in the more recent UN sources as a projection; and we used the
medium variant.

But since estimates for this recent period could not

deviate substantill y from the actual, at least with respect to change
from the preceding two decades, we felt it justified to include them to
form an observed 25 year span, 1950-1975.
4

In his The Population of India and Pakistan (Princeton University

Press, Princeton 1951), Kingsley Davis estimated the average annual death
rate by decades from 1881-91 to 1931-41, showing a level of about 43
per thousand in the first three decades, a bulge in 1911-21 (associated
with the influenza pandemic of 1918) to 48. 6, and then a decline to 36.1 in
1921-31 and 31.3 in 1931-41 (p. 37).

The estimated crude birth rates

were set at between 46 and 49 in the first four of the six decades, and
then at 4i in 1921-31 and 45 in 1931-41 (p. 69).

This combination of

relative constancy of the birth rate between 1920 and 1940, with a sub
stantial decline in the death rate, is what we are assuming in the ten
tative calculation in the text.
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5

See particularly the paper for this Conference by Professor Samuel

H. Preston on "Causes and Consequences of Mortality Declines in Less De
veloped Countries During the Twentieth Century" for a wide-ranging summary
and bibliography.

I also found a wealth of data and interpretation in

the articles by Professor George H. Stolnitz, beginning with the twopart paper, "A Century of International Mortality Trends," Population
Studies, vol. 9 and 10, July 1955 and July 1966 (reviewing the evidence
to 1950) and concluding with the latest, "International Mortality Trends:
Some Main Facts and Implications," in United Nations, The Population Debate,
vol. I, New York 1975, pp. 220-236.
6

A useful brief description of the assumptions underlying the pro-

jections, and the criteria of plausibility used in selecting them, is in
United Nations, World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963, New York
1966, Chapter 2, pp. 6-7.

A wider review of the field is in Chapter XV,

pp. 558-588 of United Nations, The Determinants and Consequences of Popu
lation Trends, Vol. I, New York 1973.
7

It is possible to secure from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook

1957,the distribution of population among continents and sub-continents
in 1920, as well as of the land area (including internal waters); and
we find in Colin Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, 3rd edit. London

1957, a distribution of land among major parts of the world, the land
evaluated with respect to rainfall, temperature and other climatic factors
that affect suitability for intensive cultivation (Table XXXIII, inset
before p. 309).
1·

Comparing the large areas within the group that com-

prises the LDCs we find the following percentage distributions (LDCs,
comprising the regions distinguished= 100)
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7 (continued)
Population
~1920)
East and S.East Asia
Southwest Asia
Africa
Latin America

Total Land

Land in
Standard Units

77.0

24.8

29.4

3.7

8.2

1.3

11.7

39.4

31.8

7.6

27.6

37.5

East and Southeast Asia in the first line is dominated by the
Sinic and Hindic group; and the capacity shown to sustain enormous
populations with a land endowment that is less than a third of that in
the rest of the less developed world is striking.
8

see Eduardo E. Arriaga and Kingsley Davis, "The Pattern of Mortality

Change in Latin America," Demography,vol. 6 no. 3, August 1969, pp. 223-242.
9 rn 1920, of some 1,187 million population estimated in the less de
veloped regions (defined as countries outside of Europe, North America,
Japan, Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand, and Temperate South America),
only 69 million were living in places with population of 20,000 or more.
While this low percentage of less than 6 was largely due to the dominance
of Asia, a level of slightly over 10 percent was the highest shown for
any sub-region.

See, United Nations, Growth of the World's Urban and Rural

Population, 1920-2000, New York, 1969, Tables 47-49, pp. 115-117.
10

see United Nations, The Determinants and Consequences of Population

Trends (first edition, New York 1953, p. 63).
11

See the Davis monograph cited in footnote 4.

The conversion ratio

used in the text is described on p. 36 of the monograph.

The data on

children born and surviving to rural families in Punjab, in 1939, for
various occupational class groups are in Table 26, p. 78, with discussion
in the text (on p. 76) stressing some limitations of the data.
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12 The

data are from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of

the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1,
Washington, 1975.

The series on gross and net reproduction rates are

series B36-41, p. 53; those on crude birth rates are series B5-10, p.
49; and those on crude death rates are series Bl67-180, p. 59.
13

See, e.g., the latest paper by I. Ajami, "Differential ·Fertility

in Peasant Communities:

A Study of Six Iranian Villages," Population

Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, November 1976, pp. 453-463, and the literature
cited therein, particularly the early paper by W. Stys, "The Influence
of Economic Conditions on the Fertility of Peasant Women," Population
Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, November 1957, pp. 136-148 ..
14 For

a brief discussion of the relation between the health revolution

and economic development see the paper by the World Health Organization,
"Health Trends and Prospects in Relation to Population and Development,"
in United Nations, The Population Debate, vol. 1, pp. 573-597.

The same

paper contains some discussion of the relation between the decline in
infant mortality and the birth rate.
15 In

this connection one may refer to two papers on population growth

and income distribution, in the United Nations volume, Population Debate,
vol. 1 cited in footnote 14 above.

The first, by Dharam P. Ghai, "Popu

lation Growth, Labour Absorption, and Income Distribution," (pp. 502-509)
summarizes the conclusions by listing in Table 2 (p. 509) the effects
of population growth on income distribution--under two major headings of
"high fertility" and "reduced fertility"--with the levels and trends of
mortality not mentioned.

In the other paper, by H.W. Singer, "Income

Distribution and Population Growth," (pp. 510-517), there is explicit

-6715 (continued)
mention of lower mortality as "a necessary first step towards achieving
the more desirable low birth rate/low death rate type of equilibrium... "
(p. 516).

But this statement is followed by considering effects of a

more equal distribution on death rates; with no discussion of the re
verse, the possible effects of declines in mortality on the income
distribution in the LDCs.

Yet with all the interest in the latter,

the possible effects of the trends in mortality rather than in fertility
that dominated the demographic changes in the LDCs in the last few decades
seem to be neglected.
16

Much of the literature on the response of fertility to mortality

declines concentrates on the response of families to the actually in
curred death of a child (or children) and the observed reaction.

See

in this connection the Preston paper cited in footnote S above, the
paper for this conference by Professor Yoram Ben Porath on "Fertility
and Child Mortality--Issues in the Demographic Transition of a Migrant
Population."
1
~

Of particular interest are also Professor Preston's paper

Health Programs and Population Growth," Population and Development Review,

vol. 1, no. 2, December 1975, pp. 189-200; and his summary Introduction
to the volume of Proceedings of the CICRED Seminar on Infant Mortality
in Relation to the Level of Fertility (the Proceedings were not available
to me at the time of writing).

For lack of familiarity with the details

of most of the sample studies involved, one cannot judge whether the
failure to "replace" children's mortality completely can be translated
into an effective absence of a desired number of children as a target
firm enough to explain the failure to reduce the birth rate in response
to a perceived decline in mortality.

There is an apparent lack

of symmetry between a situation in which birth frequency has to be
raised in an active response to the loss of a child and a situation
in which births have to be reduced in response to an increased
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number of surviving children.
At any rate, it seemed of interest to stress in the brief discussion
here aspects o~ lag, of perception of mortality declines, and of per
sistence of an excess in the possible number of desired surviving chil
dren over that actually resulting through much of the early phase of the
downtrend in mortality in the LDCs.
17

The death rates derived for 0-4 population in lines 8 and 17 exceed

the crude death rates for total population by factors of 2.4 to 3.2 in
1950-55 and 2.7 to 3.6 in 1970-75.

Multiplying these ratios by the pro

portion of 0-4 to total population, averaged over each of the two quin
quennia, we can derive the proportions of deaths of children 0-4 to all
deaths, which would range from well over 40 percent to 50 percent or more.
The direct data on distribution of deaths by age for various countries
in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook (various years) suggest proportions
for recent years and back to the 1950s, of between 40 and somewhat over 50
percent.

The agreement cannot be checked fully, because of scarcity of

data on distribution of deaths by age; and the indication that in many
countries the deaths of infants are particularly under-reported (a bias
that would affect death rates for 0-4 population much more than total
crude death rates).

For the present illustrative purposes, further

effort at assembling data on deaths by age, or using direct information
on age-specific death rates for LDCs, did not seem worthwhile.

A more

intensive study of the effects of declines in death rates would warrant
such further effort.
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see a recent paper by John C. Caldwell, "Toward a Restatement of

Demographic Transition Theory,", Population and Development Review, vol. 2
nos 3-4, September and December 1976, pp. 321-366, whic11 stresses the "flow
from the younger generation to the older" in pretransition society and the
reverse flow in the post-transition, nucleated families.
19

This choice follows the approach in an earlier brief paper

by W. Lee Hansen, "A Note on the Cost of Children's Mortality/' The
Journal of Political Economy, vol. LXV, no. 3, June 1957, pp. 257-62.
This paper was stimulated by a desire to correct an exaggerated and
erroneous estimate of the proportional cost of children's mortality
made rather casually for India by D. Ghosh, who set this cost as high as
22.5 percent of national income (compared with Hansen's medium estimate
of less than 3 percent).

Hansen's note employed somewhat more elaborate

assumptions than are followed
than those used here.

and used data for countries and dates other

But as will be seen below, the general order of

conclusions, when limited to children's mortality, is about the same.
The topic here is clearly a part of the wider theme of the
economics of family formation in the demographic transition, subject of
a brief and illuminating paper by Frank Lorimer, "The Economics of Family
Formation under Different Conditions," United Nations, World Population
conference, 1965, volume II, New York 1967, pp. 92-95.

